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Abstract 
Some reflections are offered on challenges and opportunities for the JRC as a 
‘boundary organisation’ between science and policy, at a time of increased 
complexity and polarisation and decreased trust in scientific enterprise. Some 
specific threats are identified in relation to the key role played by the JRC in the 
practice of front-line policy support. JRC is identified as a potentially relevant 
player to improve the quality of evidence feeding into the policy process. To 
achieve this potential, the JRC must develop in-house cultures and styles of 
reflexivity and humility, adopt more participatory styles of science co-production, 
and become confident enough of its role that it can dare to say ‘the emperor is 
naked’ whenever EU institutions appear to be in need of such a call.  
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Executive Summary  
As the European Commission’s (EC) in-house science service, the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) has important roles and stakes to play in the complex landscape 
between science and policy.  
 
The JRC performs anticipatory research as well as evidence production, validation 
and critical appraisal for the Commission services. In recent years the JRC 
contributed to more than thirty-five impact assessments on various subjects, 
ranging from climate change to financial economics issues.  
 
The JRC also provides a critical role as a hinge between applied science and 
academia, and bridges academia with the other services of the European 
Commission. Less often JRC fosters linkages between universities and businesses 
through innovation and technology transfer. Technologies developed or mastered 
by the JRC are at times deployed in support of EC direct intervention, e.g. in cases 
of natural disasters or human accidents. All of these features are a result of JRC 
history and make JRC’s position unique, with distinct differences from mission-
oriented national or international laboratories and organisations.   
 
In this multiple role, the JRC often finds itself at the centre of controversy, given 
that controversy currently surrounds several issues where science is called on to 
play a role: from GMO to climate, from bees and pesticides to shale gas fracking. 
Some issues, for which once upon a time a linear model of input from science to 
policy seemed possible, have even become ‘wicked’, meaning that they are 
deeply entangled in a web of hardly separable facts, interests and values. The 
present day sees media openly challenging trust in science, while norms 
associated with the scientific enterprise are under concerned scrutiny. A non-
reproducibility tsunami is hitting medical research, organic chemistry syntheses 
work, social sciences, and many other research fields, and some historians link 
this to a collapse of norms due to the commoditisation of research.     
 
Several challenges face the JRC:  
 
 ‘Policy-based evidence’ can hardly be separated from ‘evidence-
based policy’ when the dense agenda and strict deadlines of the 
policy cycle rush our scientists to support colleagues in the policy 
branches of the European Commission. The former though should 
not obliterate the latter. In these circumstances, transparency and 
humility become the JRC’s best line of defence to uphold quality 
throughout the process of scientific advice to policy.  
 Linked to the above is the issue of “stealth advocacy”, where 
scientists claim to be focusing on science but are really seeking to 
advance a political agenda or, even unwittingly, a normative stance. 
As an example, in the field of economic policy the JRC may lack the 
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breadth of perspectives which one would expect from a mature 
research organisation. 
 The JRC may become hostage to one party in a dispute in which 
different branches of the European Commission hold divergent 
views.  
 The JRC may be tempted to copy the styles of policy EC services, e.g. 
in trying to provide ‘unified’ or ‘consensus’ views respecting given 
sectorial policy lines, or to attempt an in-house compression of the 
plurality of views emerging from the JRC’s own multidisciplinarity. 
This may lead to unwarranted simplifications of complexity and 
deprive the users of JRC work of the necessary breadth and 
spectrum of advice. 
 The JRC is apparently incapable of offering itself moments of true 
reflections on contested issues.  
 Last but not least, a dangerous mind set in science advice to policy is 
adherence to the so called ‘deficit model’, according to which an 
issue becomes ‘wicked’, and public perception, acceptance and trust 
of science deteriorate simply because the public, the policy makers, 
and other lay actors all lack the scientific expertise which would 
allow them to understand the technical argument. Along the same 
lines, JRC researchers can take for granted science’s impartiality and 
neutrality. 
 
Two central features of the JRC are that it is part of the policy cycle on the one 
hand but is naturally close to academia on the other. JRC has developed a 
considerable experience with dealing with wicked issues. In this process JRC is 
learning that a wide range of epistemic positions and worldviews must be 
considered and brought to bear in the policy process. It does not befit JRC – if it 
ever befitted the European Commission – to adhere to a pensée unique. Dogmas 
tend to be contested in stakeholder consultations, in parliaments’ hearings and 
on the media, and this has to be factored in by the JRC already at the stage of ex 
ante policy appraisal and notably in impact assessment studies.   
 
The JRC already is and can increasingly position itself as a ‘boundary organisation’, 
defined as a type of organisation delegated to tackle issues at the interface 
between science and society. More than to the current extent, JRC should 
especially engage in participatory science and spearhead examples of knowledge 
co-production, responding to actual citizens’ concerns. 
 
The JRC could support the EU policies with evidence, while at the same time 
providing the institutions acting those policies with epistemic legitimacy. Evidence 
provided by the JRC and deployed by the EC could be of a certified nature, where 
certification would be ensured by the pluralistic nature of the process generating 
the evidence, tested over different disciplines and normative stances.   
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The present straw man has been prepared for consideration by the JRC in order 
for the organisation profile itself in the field of science and policy. To this effect 
the brief concludes with a ‘to do’ list and timetable which includes:  
 
(i) communication to the media of JRC’s approach by the senior 
management,  
(ii) launch of a series of seminars and trainings on science and technology 
studies (STS), 
(iii) introspective analysis of JRC worked examples and studies, with 
interview of relevant staff or ex-staff,  
(iv) preparation of a JRC green paper on science and policy (of which the 
present straw man is the inception),  
(v) presentation to the commission services via all relevant channels of 
JRC progresses.    
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PREAMBLE  
 
Here we make two assumptions: (1) that the Joint Research Centre is a boundary 
institution1 at the crossroads of the scientific and policy spheres and as such is endowed 
with a unique role within the European Commission itself, and (2) that its current role is 
facing critical challenges which are specific and different from the important challenges 
facing EU institutions, specifically the European Commission.  
Wanted or unwanted hybridisations2 of role, authority, and competence are a pervasive 
reality among different types of organisations and the political and social context in 
which they are embedded.  The JRC must come to terms with the intertwining of political, 
societal and business spheres, above all because it can no longer guarantee the original 
meanings of its assigned mandates and authority. This situation warrants a debate on 
how to approach these challenges, in order to transform these challenges into an 
opportunity for the JRC to reposition itself. 
Through a brief account of the history of the JRC, we will try to understand to what 
models of science and policy the JRC has been subscribing; next, in order to highlight 
JRC’s specificity, we shall compare it with other two emblematic institutions that are akin 
to the JRC. We proceed next to identify recent pivotal changes, on-going tensions, and 
public debates affecting the scientific endeavour, science governance and science-based 
policy advice to which the JRC is not immune. Finally, we suggest a roadmap for a 
reflexive and negotiated repositioning of the JRC, which makes justice of its uniqueness 
within the European Commission but also within the EU. 
 
 
  
                                                        
1
 Here we adopt a definition of boundary organisation by D. Guston (2001); see later in this document. 
2
 Or if one prefers ‘blurring’, ‘democratisation’ or other euphemisms.   
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1. What the history of the JRC can tell us about science 
advice to policy 
 
History and historical accounts are essential tools in the field of social studies of science 
and technology, commonly known as Science and Technology Studies (STS). The study of 
history can contribute to understanding the place and nature of science in various ways: 
for example, STS may bring to the surface historical myths, assumptions, knowledge 
claims, cultural roots and analogies that frequently find their way into the imaginaries 
that underlie policy initiatives and discourses. An example of this approach as applied to 
the concept of a European Research Area in in Rommetveit et al. (2013). In addition, this 
hindsight enriches foresight and anticipation activities (Higgit & Wilsdom 2013).  
If one wants to contribute reflexively to a vision for the role of JRC in policy-relevant 
scientific research and to a political desire of evidence-based policy making, one 
inevitably needs to look briefly at the history3 of the organisation in these specific 
contexts. Here we look briefly at the JRC’s origins and original mandate, including its 
place within other European Institutions, exploring to what extent the JRC has responded 
to models of science and policy in the last 20 years.  
The JRC is today a Directorate-General of the European Commission, and strives to act as 
a reference centre for research-based policy support in the EU. Historically, the JRC 
developed first as a ‘joint nuclear centre’, following 
the signature in 1957 of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) treaty by six European 
countries. In fact, as “the nuclear industry started to 
expand at an unprecedented rate, national 
authorities in many European countries considered it 
critical to be able to further develop nuclear 
knowledge: for example, neutron data were urgently 
needed for reactor design, waste management and reactor safety calculations” 
(European Commission 2009). Hence, in 1959 the Ispra site of the JRC was inaugurated, 
with the Ispra-1 nuclear reactor being completed within a year from its start; this site 
became part of the then ‘European Community’ in 1961. Throughout the 1970s the scope 
of the JRC was diversified in response to the reduced urgency for nuclear research, the 
emergence of new themes worthy of European research, and the need for collaboration 
and coordination. This led to programmes on renewable energy, informatics and 
materials research, which were eventually formalised in 1973 through the starting of a 
multi-annual research work programme overseen by a committee of experts from the 
Member States (MS). These experts provided guidance for the research and ensured the 
transfer of research results to the relevant communities in the MS; this was the beginning 
of the successive establishment of the JRC’s Board of Governors in 2007. 
During the 1980’s, a major JRC focus has also been that of establishing research 
partnerships with industry. This is because “there was widespread debate across the 
European Economic Community (EEC) on how research and technological development 
activities could strengthen industrial competitiveness in the community. This led to the 
                                                        
3
 N.B. the only source we found to give this account is an institutional brochure from 2007 celebrating the 50 
years of the JRC. “Highlights of the JRC: 50 years in Science”. JRC publication number JRC37585. Ideally this 
work should be done with social research, interviewing those that have been in this house from the start and 
those who have accompanied the evolution of this institution in the last 25 years. 
In 1985 The JRC and the DG for 
Research (then DG XII) are 
merged (COM decision 
85/953/Euratom) but in 1996 
the JRC and DG RTD were 
uncoupled. 
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launch of industry-related programmes and improved collaboration between industry-
related programmes and improved collaboration between industry and research” 
(European Commission 2009). In order to achieve better research results the JRC was 
increasingly involved in collaborative projects across the EU and encouraged to work 
more closely with national research bodies.  
 
During the 1990’s important research programmes focused on public health, safety and 
security. This move into entirely new fields reflected the challenges and developments of 
the time. At the end of the nineties, food scares such as BSE4 and dioxin contamination 
led to the creation of the DG Health and Consumer protection (today’s DG SANCO), 
separating the issue of food safety from that of industry and the environment; at the JRC 
the Institute for the Health and Consumer protection (IHCP) was created responding to a 
number of files which are emblematic still today. Another extension of the JRC was the 
establishment of the Institute for prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) responding to 
“the need to address new policy challenges involving both socio-economic and a scientific 
or technological dimension” (European Commission 2009). The JRC accompanied the 
burgeoning of restructurings around Europe, by merging institutes, renaming some (one 
institute refocused on security, for example), broadening the organisation’s research 
portfolio.  Throughout these developments the JRC continued to assert its mission to 
provide impartial technical advice on its relevant policy files (see Box 1.1).  
 
Already in 1998 the JRC started activities on detection of GM in food by validation of 
analytical methodologies in the IHCP and production of certified reference materials in an 
Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM). During the 2000s a number 
of what became known as “community reference laboratories” (CRLs) were established in 
various fields: feed additives, heavy metals, mycotoxins, polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons, GM food and feed (in 2004), and food contact materials.  
 
In the middle of the 2000s, a number of forward-thinking activities were put in place. 
Reflexive and anticipatory activities were given a more prominent place. The role of 
social sciences – though marginal – was promoted especially in the field of quantitative 
economic analysis and techno-economic foresight, with emphasis with impact 
assessment studies. Employment, education, taxation, single market and financial 
stability became part of the JRC’s remit.  
 
Box 1.1: Changing mission of the JRC over the last decade. 
2002: The mission of the JRC is to provide 
customer-driven scientific and technical 
support for the conception, development, 
implementation and monitoring of EU policies. 
As a service of the European Commission, the 
JRC functions as a reference centre of science 
and technology for the Union. Close to the 
policy making process, it serves the common 
interest of Member States, while being 
independent of social interests whether 
private or national. 
2013: As the Commission's in-house science 
service, the Joint Research Centre's mission is 
to provide EU policies with independent, 
evidence-based scientific and technical 
support throughout the whole policy cycle. 
Working in close cooperation with policy 
Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key 
societal challenges while stimulating 
innovation through developing new methods, 
tools and standards, and sharing its know-how 
with the Member States, the scientific 
community and international partners. 
 
In Box 1.1 we compare 2 texts of the mission statement of the JRC at different times. 
Whilst the overall mission remains unchanged, and core values of independence are 
                                                        
4
 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy commonly designated as “mad cow disease”. 
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maintained, one can see some interesting changes. For example, the “customer-driven” 
approach of the early 2000s is strongly substituted by a unique customer, the policy DGs 
of the EC. The closer collaborations with MS are substituted with closer collaborations 
with policy DGs. Another aspect that is certainly common to both is the framing of the 
mission on the narratives of authority. In the mission statement of 2002 the JRC is 
presented as an institutional reference tout court, which is somehow still visible through 
the sharing of its know-how with MS in the 2013 mission statement. 
 
Overall, one can argue that while on the one hand the JRC has promptly addressed 
pressing societal and policy issues, on the other hand it has uncritically adopted the 
narratives of the time. These narratives included control, prediction, objectivity and 
neutrality of science and science-advice to policy, besides the recurrent quest for 
harmonisation across the EU. 
 
The key question is now how can the JRC conjugate or temper the respect of the EC’ 
accepted wisdoms, e.g. on innovation, growth, sustainability, and at the same time 
maintain a careful eye on the emerging or antagonist narratives on the very same 
subjects? In the economy of a complex organisation such as the European Commission, 
and of the necessary dialectic between ‘preserving’ and ‘innovating’, the JRC’s role could 
perhaps hang on the latter, at times incisively so.  
 
To make an example, classic positivistic narratives of prediction and control have been 
challenged in recent decades by more inquisitive questioning of the current state of 
science to policy advice, after the media exposed dysfunctional uses of scientific 
knowledge that ended in failure, untailored policy making, privilege of prevailing 
narratives of human development and normalisation of human action. At the same time, 
the prevailing market-based neoliberal philosophies - which naturally underpin the 
positivistic narratives - have been called into question following the onset of the present 
crisis (Mirowski 2013).  
 
From the very beginning the JRC has engaged with research on the broader societal 
impacts of certain types of technology. It has also progressively applied itself to 
harmonisation and standardisation processes overcoming national specificities and 
cultures across the EU, and has enlarged and changed priorities in order to respond to 
pressing societal and political pressures of our times. The evolution of the texts of the JRC 
missions are also interesting to look at to the extent that they reflect not only the gradual 
self-attributed role of independent advice but also the drivers of consensus in multiple 
forms; from standards, exemplary re-usable reference methods and tools that are 
eagerly transferred to MS. 
1.1 Rough Mapping of the history of the JRC onto models of Science and 
Policy 
 
There are several ways (or conceptual models) to look at the relation between science 
and decision-making in policy processes. We will use models of the interfaces between 
science and policy developed at the JRC itself by Silvio Funtowicz5 and his co-authors, 
                                                        
5 
Presently at the Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities (SVT) at the University of Bergen, 
Norway. 
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including the American-born Oxford scholar Jerome Ravetz, and many others in the 
course of the past three decades6. 
 
Starting from the "modern model" of perfection and perfectibility which represents a 
classic “technocratic” vision, where there are no limits to the progress of humans’ 
control over their environment, and no limits to the material and moral progress of 
mankind, Funtowicz (2006) offers an evolutionary perspective of the governance of 
science in policy making through several stages and styles:  
 Precautionary model:  precaution is introduced as a normative element. The 
model focuses on uncertain and inconclusive information. It arises from 
discovering that the scientific facts are neither fully certain in themselves, nor 
conclusive for policy; therefore an extra, normative, element is introduced in 
policy decisions, precaution, which both protects and legitimises decisions. 
 Framing model: stakeholders perspectives are introduced. The focus here is on 
the arbitrariness of choice and possible misuse. This model arises from the 
recognition that in the absence of conclusive facts, scientific information 
becomes one among many inputs to a policy process, functioning as evidence in 
the arguments. Stakeholders perspectives and values become relevant and even 
the choice of the scientific discipline to which the “problem” belongs becomes a 
prior policy decision, part of the debate among those affected by the relevant 
issue.  
 Demarcation model: demarcations for protecting science from the political 
interference that would threaten its integrity. This model is especially concerned 
with the possibility of the abuse of science. It arises because the scientific 
information and advice that are used in the policy process is created by people 
working in institutions with their own agendas. It recognises that “scientific” 
information and advice cannot be guaranteed to be objective and neutral.  In 
this sense, science can be abused when used as evidence in the policy process.  
A clear demarcation between the institutions (and individuals) who provide the 
science, and those where it is used, is advocated as a means of protecting 
science from the political interference that would threaten its integrity. 
 Extended participation: The ideal of rigorous scientific demonstration is replaced 
by that of open public dialogue. The model acknowledges the difficulties of 
defending a monopoly of accredited expertise for the provision of scientific 
information and advice. “Science” (understood as the activity of technical 
experts) is included as one part of the ‘relevant knowledge’ which is brought in 
as evidence to a process. The ideal of rigorous scientific demonstration is 
replaced by that of open public dialogue. Citizens become both critics and 
creators in the knowledge production process as part of an extended peer 
community. It is argued that it is within the “extended participation” model of 
science and policy that new relations between science and the publics are 
usefully operated, underpinning upstream public engagement in knowledge 
production.  
If one looks at the JRC history, including its mission statements, one can see that it has 
responded in some ways to the first three models, whilst remaining firmly attached to 
the core activity of the modern model, i.e. “the experts’ (desire for) truth speaking to the 
politicians’ (need for) power”. It is clear however, that the JRC does not engage with the 
public in policy formulation. Neither its mission nor its operation implies dialogical 
                                                        
6
 For recent accounts see Carrozza, 2014; Hessels & van Lente, 2008.  
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engagement with the public in the process of knowledge production or assessment. At 
the European Commission it is often the case that some forms of public engagement are 
actually left to the policy DGs through mechanisms such as the portal ‘Your Voice’, the 
inclusion of civil society organisations in committees and task forces, and the standard of 
consultation which are part of the European Commission impact assessment practices 
and guidelines7.  Although these activities have some value for the policy cycle, they 
remain confined in their actual function of consultation. Moreover, with regard to the 
JRC, they have very limited influence in the way science is conducted within the JRC and 
therefore on the advice provided.  
1.2 Debate at the JRC 
Let us assume for the sake of discussion that the model of extended participation is 
indeed desirable one for science advice to policy, as advocated by Funtowicz & Ravetz 
(1990), Jasanoff (2005), Gluckman (2014), Sarewitz (2013) and many others.  
Could the JRC, given its institutional fabric and commitments, adopt such a model?  
A way of answering the question is that whether we purposefully engage with the public 
or not is not an option but a necessity; the digital culture is changing knowledge 
governance, and what were once illuminated promises, such as quality assurance of 
policy-relevant science by extended peer review (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1985; 1990) and co-
production of mutually supporting forms of knowledge (Jasanoff 1996), have today 
‘materialised’ and have a societal place.  Hence it could be argued – as we set up to 
demonstrate in the present analysis - that embracing a model of extended participation 
amounts to deepening the boundary work that is inherent to the JRC work. This would 
encompass the creation of ‘safe spaces’ that allow deeper involvement of the public in 
our supporting role to policy.  
A relevant question is nevertheless the following: is the JRC ready to engage with the 
public beyond the reduced perspectives of just ‘educating’ it – e.g. via training the public 
on science, or ‘studying’ it, e.g. in the context of behavioural investigations? If so, what 
skills does the JRC need to acquire and what practices are we ready to embrace?  
  
                                                        
7
 The European Commission has ‘Stakeholder consultation guidelines’ in the context of impact assessment 
activities, under revision at the timing of the present work. For example, the Commission opens to 
consultation via the “Your Voice” portal some policy files. This portal is poorly accessed and disseminated. 
Moreover, it is not clear how the results of the consultations affect policy making. One of the conditions of 
institutional trust lies precisely in transparency, in this case and simply put, it is not obvious how the opinion 
of citizens who participate in these consultations influence the actual policy proposal. 
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2. The JRC in the context of other International 
organisations  
Here we look at two different types of organisation that are akin with the stated JRC 
mission but have a different place in the policy and societal context; those differences 
resonate across their stated mission, function, operation and styles of knowledge 
governance. We have chosen an international institution, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)8 – see Box 2.1 – and a member state research 
institute with strong international projection, the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft - Europe’s 
largest application-oriented research organisation – see Box 2.2. It is obvious that a 
straightforward comparison cannot be done because the three institutions are inherently 
different, but they have many mutual axes. The purpose here is rather to reflect on the 
uniqueness of the JRC within the existing institutional context and to understand what 
evolution can be expected for our institution. 
 
Whilst, through its core values and vision, the OECD seems to have embedded qualities of 
anticipation, dialogical practices and a much needed capacity to reflexively challenge 
received views, we also see that the OECD’s narratives for human betterment are based 
on market-driven imaginaries of growth. To our knowledge, the OECD is rather cautious 
in moving away from this paradigm and to follow the critiques of the neoliberal model 
which have received impetus from the present crisis. A study produced in house by the 
JRC has recently argued, for example, that the International Monetary fund (IMF) is more 
                                                        
8
 http://www.OECD.org/about/ 
Box 2.1 The mission of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) is “to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of 
people around the world”. The OECD provides a forum in which governments can work 
together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems. The OECD works 
with governments to understand what drives economic, social and environmental change. 
It measures, analyses and compares productivity and global flows of trade and investment 
in order to “predict future trends”. The OECD is also engaged in setting international 
standards on a wide range of issues. The OECD also claims that “drawing on facts and real-
life experience, [it] recommends policies designed to improve the quality of people's lives”, 
working with a large range of stakeholders from business, labour and civil society 
organisations. The discourse of the OECD is firmly aligned with imaginaries of innovation 
and growth as main pillars of their action with worldwide governments. Their core values 
are stated as:  
• “Objective: Our analyses and recommendations are independent and evidence-based. 
• Open: We encourage debate and a shared understanding of critical global issues. 
• Bold: We dare to challenge conventional wisdom starting with our own. 
• Pioneering: We identify and address emerging and long term challenges. 
• Ethical: Our credibility is built on trust, integrity and transparency” 
 
On their 50th anniversary, the OECD Members reaffirmed OECD’s founding goals and set 
out a vision for the OECD’s evolution to ensure its effective and influential role in a rapidly 
changing world so as to promote the well-being of citizens: “We are determined that the 
OECD will continue to help countries develop policies together to promote economic 
growth and healthy labour markets, boost investment and trade, support sustainable 
development, raise living standards, and improve the functioning of markets. This vision 
also underscores our resolve to make the OECD a more effective and inclusive global policy 
network.” 
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reflexive than both the OECD and the EC when it comes to the relative virtues of different 
economic models (Saltelli & Dragomirescu Gaina 2014).   
The point here is not that we face an ‘All-Yin-and-no-Yang’ organisation but that the Yin – 
perceived as a fundamental adherence to the economisation of everything – is in the 
driving seat, while the organisation’s Yang – with its concern for increasing inequality and 
unfairness of the present arrangements, sits in the back. When the concerns of the 
environment are factored in, this is as much as possible framed in the context of the 
prevailing wisdom, such as witnessed e.g. in the support for the monetary evaluation of 
environmental goods (cost benefit analysis of everything – see Renda et al. 2013) or the 
implausible recipes to ‘circularise’ the economy in the context of a high throughput, ever 
more competitive society.    
 
Both the OECD and the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Institute, taken as stone of comparison 
for the JRC, influence the future through their research and technology development. 
They are aligned to current narratives of human betterment based on innovation, 
competitiveness and growth. The JRC on the other hand does not focus on “applied 
research”, and even less for private enterprises since the JRC’s main clients at present are 
the policy DGs or institutions in MS. The JRC has a different profile. 
 
2.1 The uniqueness of the JRC 
The JRC is not an institution that promotes policies as does the OECD; it is not a research 
and educational institution as a University or an institution that conducts research “to 
benefit private and public enterprise” as are the Fraunhofer Institutes. The JRC is a 
Directorate-General of the European Commission, but contrary to other DGs it resonates 
with what can be called a boundary organisation (Guston 2001). These types of 
organisations meet “three criteria: first, they provide the opportunity and sometimes the 
incentives for the creation and use of boundary objects9 and standardised packages; 
                                                        
9
 I.e. information or knowledge that is used in different ways by different communities and networks. This 
concept was introduced by Star and Griesemer (1989).  
Box 2.2.The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Institute conducts applied research for both private and 
public enterprises, as well as for the general benefit of the public. The institution takes its 
name from Joseph von Fraunhofer (1787-1826), the illustrious Bavarian researcher, inventor 
and entrepreneur. The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft conducts research under contract for 
industry, the service sector and public administration offering information and services. 
Fraunhofer claims that its  “research efforts are geared entirely to people’s needs: health, 
security, communication, energy and the environment”, which, Fraunhofer claims, has 
therefore significant impact on people’s lives. Fraunhofer is  strongly oriented to technology 
development: it “designs products”; its researchers “are creative”; they “shape technology”; 
they improve methods and techniques” and they “open up new vistas”. In short, Fraunhofer 
“forges the future”. The Mission Statement of this institution outlines the character of 
“custom-driven” research activities and their strong business orientation:  
 “The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft promotes and conducts applied research in an 
international context to benefit private and public enterprise and is an asset to 
society as a whole.  
 By developing technological innovations and novel systems solutions for their 
customers, the Fraunhofer Institutes help to reinforce the competitive strength of 
the economy in their region, throughout Germany and in Europe. [Their] research 
activities are aimed at promoting the economic development of our industrial 
society, with particular regard for social welfare and environmental compatibility.” 
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second, they involve the participation of actors from both sides of the boundary, as well 
as professionals who serve a mediating role; third, they exist at the frontier of the two 
relatively different social worlds of politics and science, but they have distinct lines of 
accountability to each” (Guston op. cit.).  
The JRC performs anticipatory research as well as scientific evidence production, 
validation and critical appraisal for different Commission services. For example, in recent 
years the JRC contributed to more than thirty-five impact assessments on various 
subjects, ranging from climate change to financial and economic issues.  
The JRC acts as a hinge between science and academia, populates the different corners of 
the research, education and innovation triangle10, bridges academia with the other 
services of the European Commission, and fosters linkages between universities and 
businesses through innovation and technology transfer. The JRC recently set up a 
network of technology transfer offices belonging to Europe's large public research 
organisations to test new methods of cooperation and an Innovation Observatory to 
collect relevant statistics at the service of the Innovation Union agenda. Thanks to its 
enlarged portfolio of competences JRC has a role to play in the monitoring of the 
achievement of the EU 2020 objectives as well as fostering optimal use of cohesion funds 
through its smart specialisation platform.          
 
2.2 Debate at the JRC 
Unlike other services of the European Commission and other analogous institutions, the 
JRC has an in-house and inbuilt capacity for reflexivity, through its multidisciplinary 
characteristics that critically support science advice to policy. It is not infrequent for the 
JRC to speak with ‘more than one voice’ in relation to important policy files. Yet, this is 
most often perceived by the organisation as a shortcoming rather than as an asset, also 
due to the presumed political constraints of the JRC, and the fact that the European 
Commission is perhaps not mature enough to use the JRC as a boundary organisation. 
We would argue that there is perhaps a crucial missing link in the JRC’s structure which 
prevents it from truly critically assuring robustness of evidence over a broader spectrum 
of social norms and values. 
As Pielke (2007) and others pointed out, most thoughtful advisers can help define 
plausible strategic choices in the light of disagreement and controversy in the assessment 
of uncertain evidence. This requires a great amount of individual introspection and 
institutional courage. Looking critically at current narratives of innovation should not be 
seen as a disservice to EU citizens; responsible scrutiny of dissent about main narratives 
by which we are living today should help policy to find alternative paths of societal 
development, knowledge production and betterment of the human condition.   
In conclusion, through the previous and this section we have seen how the JRC is far from 
embracing an extended participation model of science and policy and how instead 
because of its boundary stand that model would seem to be the most natural one to 
follow. Is the JRC ready to consider adding to its mission statement the deepening of 
boundary work? 
  
                                                        
10
 “Research, education and innovation are three central and strongly interdependent drivers of the 
knowledge-based society. Together they are referred to as the “knowledge triangle”. To realise ERA 
[European Research Area], research needs to develop strong links with education and innovation.” Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/higher-education/knowledge-innovation-triangle_en.htm 
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3. Current Challenges for Science Advice to Policy that affect 
the JRC 
“Science and technology are present in all of the narratives that 
modern societies weave about the world, as essential threads in 
the tapestry of social reality.” Jasanoff 2005 
 
With the Modern State starting with the XVII century, science has become the legitimate 
and rational source for decisions and action. As many philosophers have argued, science 
has enjoyed a privileged place in the knowledge production endeavour, one that defines 
modernity and which has been labelled as a “great intellectual adventure” (Ravetz 2006). 
This state of affairs has been the subject of considerable debate and critique in the XX 
century, after thinkers such as Husserl, Toulmin, Lyotard, Shapin & Schaffer, Feyerabend, 
Lakatos and many others questioned the universal role of science in generating truth and 
adjudicating disputes.  
As a result, the scientific enterprise has been changing for a long time; as a co-production 
within the societal and political contexts in which it develops (Jasanoff 1996), for science 
it is both the best and worst of times (Le Fanu 2010): research institutions and funding 
have never been so impressive, explosively productive publication-wise but, Le Fanu, 
argues, with little advances compared with times where the funding was scarce. Yet, 
science is seen as an instrument of profit, power and privilege (Lyotard 1979; Mirowski 
2011; Ravetz 2006), and we may have entered what has been described as the period of 
“Post-Normal Science”. Post-Normal Science is a concept developed by Silvio Funtowicz 
and Jerome Ravetz, attempting to characterise a methodology of inquiry that is 
appropriate for cases where “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and 
decisions urgent” (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1991; 1992; 1993. Earlier work was in Ravetz 
1971; 1985; 1990)11.  
While we cannot summarise here a century of intellectual disputes in the field of 
epistemology12, we will outline current challenges that affect science and technology 
developments, and therefore also scientific advice to public policies, and the way both 
science and policy are mutually affected. 
It should be noted that the public sphere displays these tensions in disputes on 
technology, climate, health, and the environment. Different styles of science advice 
coexist ranging from the positivistic to the post-modern and are at times instrumentally 
invoked by the contending parties. These disputes intermingle with those affecting the 
definitions of development, sustainability, and progress, the choice of economic model, 
and the role of Economics in adjudicating facts relevant to the common good.    
An example of this state of affairs is the survival in science of the so-called Deficit Model. 
According to this model an issue becomes ‘wicked’, and public perception, acceptance 
and trust in Science is problematic simply because different actors lack the scientific 
expertise which would allow them to understand the technical argument. Thus if we 
could train, e.g. policy makers or stakeholders, including the publics, at large in maths 
and biology, then genuine progress would be achieved. ‘If only they knew!’ is a scientist’s 
                                                        
11
 Other knowledge production model worth mentioning is Mode 2 Science was coined in 1994 by Gibbons, 
Limoge, Nowotny et al.  
12
 There were ‘science wars’ in the eighties opposing natural and social sciences, and when ‘social 
constructivism’, e.g. the exercise to contextualise the generation of ‘facts’, was considered an assault on 
science. A readable short account is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_wars.  
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typical refrain associated to this view. The deficit model has its advocates (Dickson 2005), 
but we would instead favour a culture of humility of science’s input to policy, which 
especially rejects the deficit model. We do not reject this model for purely ethical 
reasons, though there would be a few. We reject it because of its limited usefulness. 
Most often the problem is not a lack of Science but of its abundance. Daniel Sarewitz, an 
American scholar, talks about the “excess of objectivity” claimed by science, so that 
“Rather than resolving political debate, science often becomes ammunition in partisan 
squabbling, mobilized selectively by contending sides to bolster their positions.” A cynical 
conclusion is that “entrenched interests need not produce ‘junk science’ when they have a 
wide selection of credentialed scientists to choose from in support of their positions” 
(Pielke 2007, p. 62).  
According to Sarewitz this may lead to scientists de facto cancelling each other out so 
that  “the more powerful political or economic interests prevail, as they would have 
without Science” (Pielke 2007, p. 62).   This is an outcome JRC fights to avoid, foremost by 
developing in house a culture of reflexivity, fostering “an internalized, cross disciplinary 
capacity for self-reflection and self-criticism” (Jasanoff 2009) which can then be brought 
to bear when JRC engages with Commission services and their stakeholders.  
The fact that scholars are critical of knowledge production modes and their governance 
trends, and the resulting tensions, are not unique to our times; those tensions arose 
under many forms at different times of human history and about different bodies of 
knowledge. For example, one can argue that through time some “institutions” of 
knowledge have established privileged relationships with the state but have 
systematically (and oftentimes intentionally) alienated from wider (lay) publics. Current 
challenges for the scientific endeavour, and in particular for science advice to policy, 
cannot be decoupled from the narratives that are used to respond to challenges to 
humans and the planet - including the definition of the challenges themselves and their 
plausibility. The debate is about the place of science and technology on addressing great 
societal challenges and the loci and bodies of knowledge to which we refer to tame 
those.  The debate has been set from different perspectives of epistemic, 
anthropological, ontological, and ethical nature. Here we examine those current 
challenges which inevitably affect the JRC, and, we would argue, in quite important ways. 
Based on these observations, we submit that a reflexive journey is imperative for the JRC, 
especially when others start speculating about its role and place.  
 
3.1 Challenges from within… 
 
Here we allude to challenges as elements of what we (and others) describe as a crisis 
within the scientific endeavour that necessarily affects science advice to policy, its 
integrity, authority and legitimacy. For the sake of clarity we have divided these into 3 
different groups but they are all strongly inter-linked: trust, quality, and legitimacy.  We 
also believe that our current digital culture has aggravated and anticipated tensions that 
have been there for a long time. 
3.1.1 Trust 
A Rightful place for science  
In his inaugural address, President Barack Obama promised to “restore science to its 
rightful place” in U.S. society. In an interdisciplinary workshop organised at Arizona State 
Straw man - Page 13 
University in 201013, a number of scholars and other societal actors set out on a reflection 
about the meaning of such a political “gift”. Where is that place? – it was asked; and how 
do we find it in an ever more complex, uncertain, and politically, socially and culturally 
diverse world? And is the rightful place of science also the place that assures the best 
outcomes for all of us?  
Relevant questions for JRC are hence not only “which is our rightful place or places” but 
also “how do we take that place and what do we fill it with”.  
Truth about the truth 
The privileged role of scientific knowledge in legitimating a common authority in pluralist 
societies, has been challenged for quite some time. ‘Solutions to the problem of 
knowledge are solutions to the problem of social order’, state Shapin and Schaffer (2011), 
a point also admirably made by Lyotard (1979). Through a number of case studies Braun 
and Koop (2014) observed that, “The expectation that scientific expertise will provide 
reliable, objective, true knowledge and thereby close down policy controversies is gone”. 
The debunking of myths about unrealistic capabilities attributed to science and scientists 
has been taken care of by philosophers, from Husserl to Lyotard, and recently by thinkers 
such as Ravetz, Wynne, Jasanoff, Sarewitz, Latour, and many others - coming from the 
field of social studies of science and technology but also from the realm of practice itself. 
In fact, the quick framing of issues in scientific terms can amount to what is described as 
“Type 3 error” - i.e. the error of answering the wrong question. The same principle exists 
in applied econometrics14. If the question is wrong the supporting evidence is irrelevant. 
An issue may be framed as one of 'risk' of a technology when the concern of the citizens 
is about whose technology is adopted and why and who controls it. Thus, scientific 
framings do not necessarily resolve socio-political controversies with scientific 
underpinnings.  
Through a number of examples from climate change, genetically modified foods and 
nuclear waste disposal, Sarewitz (2004) describes the exacerbation of controversy 
through scientised framings that misrepresent the actual issues. Another example, 
reinforced with headlines, is what Bittman (2013) described as an exercise of 
misdirection on organic foods. The study (see Smith-Sprangler et al.  2012) focuses on a 
trivial aspect of the organic versus conventional comparison, i.e. the poorly defined 
“nutritious” aspects of organic food, whilst that is not the primary reason why people 
acquire organic food. We shall revisit this topic later in the present work.  
In its multiple role, the JRC often finds itself at the centre of controversy, as controversy 
surrounds today several issues where science is called in to play a role: from GMO to 
climate, from bees and pesticides to shale gas fracking. The plain appeal of Science 
speaking truth to policy must be considered critically. Even issues where once upon a 
time a linear model of input from science to policy seemed possible have become today 
‘wicked’ (Rittel & Webber 1973), implying that they are deeply entangled in a web of 
hardly separable facts, interests and values.  
Adding to this, we live in times where the media openly challenge trust in science 
(Mombiot 2013), norms associated to the scientific endeavour are under concerned 
scrutiny (Jasanoff 2013), laboratory experiments cannot be trusted without verification 
(Sanderson 2013) and rules are on offer to spot “suspected work […in] the majority of 
preclinical cancer papers in top tier journals” (Begley 2013).  
                                                        
13
 See http://cspo.events.asu.edu/ 
14 
Peter Kennedy’s second commandment of applied econometrics reads: ‘Thou shall answer the right 
question’, Kennedy (2007). 
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Even the Economist, a usually conservative and positivist magazine, enters this debate 
commenting on the poor state of current scientific practices devoting his cover to “How 
Science goes wrong”. Its first editorial reads:  
“Science still commands enormous—if sometimes bemused—respect. But its 
privileged status is founded on the capacity to be right most of the time and to 
correct its mistakes when it gets things wrong. […] The false trails laid down by 
shoddy research are an unforgivable barrier to understanding. “ (The Economist 
19 October 2013, p. 11) 
Faithful to its positivistic imprint, The Economist (19 October 2013, p. 21-24) argues that 
technical shortcomings are among the main causes of trouble with scientific practice, 
including scientists’ incapacity to balance false positive and false negative (a statistical 
issue) and poor refereeing. The truth is perhaps more worrisome, as revealed by one of 
the sources quoted by the same magazine, Ioannides (2005), according to whom: 
“In this framework, a research finding is less likely to be true when […a list of 
statistical limitations]; when there is greater financial and other interest and 
prejudice; and when more teams are involved in a scientific field in chase of 
statistical significance.” (Ionannides Op. cit.) 
In other words Ioannides hints at normative issues associated with scientific practice. We 
shall discuss this later in relation to the privatisation of science.  Note among the 
reactions to this worrying trend the creation of the Meta-Research Innovation Centre 
launched at Stanford (METRICS), involving the John Ioannidis (Op. cit.), to combat ‘bad 
science’ (The Economist 15 March 2014).  
Language, manners and ethos  
One consequence of the 
new climate of scepticism 
and confrontation 
surrounding science’s input 
to policy is that its language 
becomes decidedly 
unceremonious, miles away 
from the aseptic tone met 
in scientific papers.   
A couple of examples will 
illustrate this trend – see 
also Box 3.1. “Beware the 
rise of the government 
scientists turned lobbyists”, 
was the headline of an 
article by British journalist 
George Mombiot in the 
left-leaning newspaper The 
Guardian (29 April 2013), 
adding that "From badgers to bees, government science advisers are routinely misleading 
us to support the politicians’ agendas.” The article criticised the current chief scientist at 
the UK's environment department for his assessment of the desirability of culling 
badgers, and the British government’s new chief scientist for his opposition to the 
European ban on the pesticides blamed for killing bees and other pollinators. From the 
other side of the ocean and the political spectrum, Rep. Chris Stewart (R-UT) asked 
Box 3.1 - On Models: Overreliance on model-generated 
crisp numbers and targets recently hit the headlines again in 
the relation to the 90% ratio of public debt to gross 
domestic product stipulated by Harvard professors Kenneth 
Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart. Debt ratios above the 
threshold were considered by these authors as unsafe for a 
country, but a later reanalysis by researchers from the 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst disproved this 
finding by tracing it to a coding error in the authors' original 
work. This particular instance of error became subject to 
self-correction, but most aspects of most models will not be 
subject to such close scrutiny. Critically, the error was 
corrected too late and much of the damage could not be 
undone, as the original model results kept austerity-minded 
economists trading blows with their anti-austerity 
counterparts on the merits and demerits of balanced 
budgets and austerity policies, a battle that dominated the 
financial press for months, was in no way defused by the 
repudiation of the Rogoff-Reihnart results. (in Saltelli et al., 
2013, Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2014) 
Straw man - Page 15 
(rhetorically) during a U.S. congressional hearing in July 2013 whether the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency's study of shale-gas fracking “is a genuine, fact-finding, 
scientific exercise, or a witch-hunt to find a pretext to regulate15.”  
Wherever one stands on these specific issues, scepticism seems on the rise, and 
increasingly independent of ideological positions. Science is facing a question: does the 
tone of these sorts of attacks reflect a collapse of trust in the scientific enterprise and in 
its social and institutional role? Scientific leaders have long portrayed their enterprise as 
a self-regulating community bound to a higher ethical commitment to truth-telling than 
society as a whole. Yet the tone and intractability of controversies suggests that society 
may be less willing to accept such claims than in the past. Seen in a JRC context these 
developments imply that the role of the JRC could easily come to the forefront of public 
debate, and find itself at the heart of hot disputes.  
Something worth recalling is that ethos is fundamental to the scientific enterprise. In the 
words of Jerome R. Ravetz (writing in 1971!), and which complements what just said on 
the privatisation of science.  
“Two separate factors are necessary for the achievement of worthwhile scientific 
results: a community of scholars with shared knowledge of the standards of 
quality appropriate for their work and a shared commitment to enforce those 
standards by the informal sanctions the community possesses; and individuals 
whose personal integrity sets standards at least high as those required by their 
community. If either of these conditions is lacking – if there is a field which is 
either too disorganized or too demoralized to enforce the appropriate standards, 
or a group of scientists nominally within the field who are content to publish 
substandard work in substandard journals – then bad work will be produced. This 
is but one of the ways in which "morale" is an important component of scientific 
activity; and any view of science which fails to recognize the special conditions 
necessary for the maintenance of morale in science is bound to make disastrous 
blunders in the planning of science. There is then a danger that a firm (or more 
commonly a government) will try to redress an error by making it bigger, and all 
considerations of what is economically viable (not to say socially desirable) will be 
cast aside. Supersonic airliners are a case in point. Hence scientific technology, as 
much as industrialized science, can suffer from a new and dangerous form of 
corruption.” 
 
Consensus is not the same as authority 
Many scholars have asserted that the authority of science resides above all on the 
accommodation of dissent and the welcoming of critics. D. Sarewitz (2011), for example, 
has argued that, “[s]cience would provide better value to politics if it articulated the 
broadest set of plausible interpretations, options and perspectives, imagined by the best 
experts, rather than forcing convergence to an allegedly unified voice.” Taking the IPCC 
example, M. Hulme (2013) challenges the assumption that consensus in science is an end 
to argument or even embedding any kind of authoritative stand.  
Ethics 
Ethics as applied to science and technology policy is in a perpetual flux. Whilst the 
application of ethics in science and technology realms has largely been in the hands of 
                                                        
15 See http://stewart.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/stewart-questions-scientific-integrity-of-epa-
hydraulic-fracturing 
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professional communities, the failures of the scientific community’s ethos in respecting 
individuals in research during World War II, and before that the role of statistical science 
in upholding eugenics (Hacking 1990), gave ethics a definitive part for addressing values 
challenges arising from techno-science developments. During the 1990s ethics was 
established as institutional practice through various forms, with the establishment of 
ethics committees producing official (though usually non-binding) opinions on ethical, 
legal, and social aspects; the creation of expert ethics committees, of ethics as expert 
knowledge, and of mandatory ethical checklists to comply with (Tallacchini 2009). Whilst 
ethics inherently bounds regulatory frameworks including science and technology 
innovation policies, the pace at which techno-science is developing is making it 
untreatable with the current institutional arrangements.  
Moreover, in certain domains of science and technology research has been further 
fragmented, including along private and public dimensions arising from privatisation of 
the scientific enterprise, collaborative and competitive enterprises, developing within 
institutional and informal spaces [the “garage” and “do it yourself” movements; the 
“Open everything” paradigm] giving rise to different ethics “strategies”. With an enlarged 
set of actors participating in the techno-scientific knowledge production with their norms 
and values, not only the loci of ethics have been distributed and extended (Lifson 1997; 
Tallacchini 2013) but also systematically interrogated, including by citizens, as well as by 
old and new media.  The digital culture has accelerated this process by providing it with 
both ever larger audiences and ever more powerful tools. 
3.1.2 Quality 
Uncertainty fabrication 
Uncertainty amplification or minimisation are standard practices operated by 
stakeholders to either support (minimising uncertainties) or deter (maximising them) the 
adoption of a policy. Famous cases of uncertainty fabrication see tobacco companies 
fighting to deny the health effect of smoking (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), and the battles 
between industry and regulators over the USA’s data quality act, where industry fought 
hard to amplify uncertainty in order to prevent regulators from imposing more stringent 
standards (Michaels 2005). 
It has also been argued that the greatest threat in science advice is not partiality 
(impartiality being an ideal rather than a practical attribute of the involved scientists) but 
rather purported impartiality, also known as stealth advocacy (Pielke 2007). As already 
discussed scientists may encumber the public debate with an extra dose of conflict and 
animosity, making controversies less amenable to a solution (Sarewitz 2004).    
Frauds and “alikes”; “Another busy week at Retraction Watch”16 
In 2011, Nature published an article on the rise of retractions of scientific papers (Van 
Noorden 2011); almost all of the retractions that hit the headlines are dramatic examples 
of misconduct, but they can also be due to honest errors, Van Noorden argued. This 
situation, in combination with situations of un-verifiability of experiments and data, 
poses challenges to the maintenance of quality of scientific publications, which becomes 
even more problematic for policy relevant science17.  
                                                        
16
 http://retractionwatch.com, (last accessed 29
th
 June 2014) 
17
 See for example, the recent proposed legislation in the USA to cover for the alleged accusation that EPA 
had relied on undisclosed and unverifiable data upon which to base its regulations; hence the proposed 
legislation seeks: To prohibit the Environmental Protection Agency from proposing, finalising, or 
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Peer review extended 
In a workshop organised by the JRC in 201118, Ehsam Massod observed, “Scientists, 
policymakers and publishers regard peer review as the gold standard in science. But how 
true is this in a world where the very idea of expertise and authority is open to question? 
Does conventional peer review make sense in a world in which anyone with a cellphone, 
a WiFi connection and a Twitter account is both reader and reviewer?”19 The rise of 
digital publications needs to be accompanied with collectively agreed ways of quality 
assurance. However, this is not just about the publications. This is about research 
framings, agendas, questions, assumptions, choices and ultimately about the choice of 
knowledge input into addressing societal matters. One can argue that current digital 
culture has at last been implementing the concept of “extended peer review” and 
extended quality assurance (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990). The “extended peer review” 
model suggests that such quality assurance is done based on different types of 
knowledge and involving an extended community of social actors. In the end of the day, 
as Jasanoff (2013) suggests “[…]a prime casualty in the age of information and 
informatics appears to be public confidence in the power of reason”; trust and quality go 
toghether. 
Knowledge governance 
The digital culture and phenomena like Citizen Science and the “Open Everything” 
paradigm (Steele 2014), where the number of actors that produce and preserve 
knowledge is broadened, certainly has effects on scientific institutions’ memories, on 
their practice and on their governance. Therefore, the processes for selecting, preserving 
and disseminating knowledge, digital or not, need interrogation.  
3.1.3 Legitimacy and Democracy 
Science - Society Interfaces 
In Europe, the UK BSE “scandal” of the mid-1980s to mid-1990s is often cited as pivotal in 
the change of direction in the relations between science and policy making. A key 
moment was the publication of the 2000 House of Lords report on Science and Society 
followed a year later by the European Commission’s Science and Society Action Plan 
(European Commission 2002), as well as the EU 5th Framework research programme’s 
“Raising Awareness of Science and Technology” activity of the late 1990s.  
In the eyes of the British public the BSE episode was epitomised by the then-Minister of 
Agriculture, John Gummer, trying to feed a beef burger to his four-year-old daughter, 
Cordelia, before media and cameras. 
                                                                                                                                                         
disseminating regulations or assessments based upon science that is not transparent or reproducible. See 
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4012 
18
 Science in a Digital Society. 17-19 May 2011. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon. See report, Pubsy nr. 
JRC68607, EUR 25201 EN. 
19
 The history of quality assurance of Open source software development (and shareware, freeware, for that 
matter) is relevant for the world of extended peer review. Over the years the “open source communities” 
have been following the Open Source Software Development (OSSD), an agreed quality process by which 
open source software is developed in agreement with software engineering life-cycle methods. It is based on 
usage, and depends largely on the size of the community of users and developers – see e.g. Khanjani and 
Sulaiman 2011.  
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Partly as a result of the failings of the deficit model (also known as Public Understanding 
of Science - “PUS”), public views of science worsened throughout the 1990s, and a new 
language of “science & society” towards dialogue and engagement emerged – see Box 
3.2. This phase corresponds to Callon et al.’s (2001) model of science and public relations 
as a “public dialogue and participation model” or the already mentioned “model of 
extended participation” – i.e. working deliberatively within imperfections (Funtowicz 
2006). As Toulmin (1997) noted, it is also during the 1990’s that ethics discussions of e.g. 
environment and medicine stepped out from the professional monopoly and reached 
wider publics. Indeed, many initiatives of public involvement in controversial issues 
depart from the academics or NGO’s and fewer from governmental institutions. With 
Horizon 2020, the deepening of these interfaces is done by setting engagement and 
ethics as key pillars of the newer governance lemma of science and technology, i.e.  
“responsible research and innovation” (RRI)20. 
Extended Facts and Civic Epistemologies 
In the concept of “post-normal science” described earlier,  
 “extended peer communities will not necessarily be passive recipients of the 
materials provided by experts. They will also possess, or create, their own 
‘extended facts’. These may include craft wisdom and community knowledge of 
places and their histories, as well as anecdotal evidence, neighbourhood surveys, 
investigative journalism and leaked documents. Such extended peer communities 
have achieved enormous new scope and power through the Internet. Activists 
scattered among large cities or rainforests can engage in mutual education and 
coordinated activity, providing themselves with the means of engagement with 
global vested interests on less unequal terms than previously. This activity is most 
important in the phases of policy-formation, and also in the implementation and 
monitoring of policies. Thus in addition to extending the traditional processes of 
quality assessment, participants can enhance the quality of the problem solving 
processes themselves.” (Funtowicz & Ravetz 2003). 
Ulrich Beck (1992) called “reflexive modernity” a state in which growing bodies of 
knowledge are accessible to growing number of individuals with added agency that 
enables them to intervene in the world. Can we argue that we are in such state?  
                                                        
20
 Looking at the semiotics of these developments at EU level we see through the preposition changes of the 
science - society research framework programs, that a deepening of such interfaces has been sought: first 
Science and Society, then Science in Society, then Science with Society, and in Horizon 2020 Science in and 
with Society.  
Box 3.2: “The GM Nation?” is often seen as an example of response to face the BSE crisis. 
The UK government sponsored a debate on genetically modified crops with the intention 
of having a wide-ranging and effective public debate, going beyond the “often polarised 
views in order to find out what people really think about GM” (Gaskel et al. 2003). It is 
important to note that this debate springs from a recommendation of the Agricultural and 
Environment Biotechnology Commission, which is an independent body that advises the 
UK government on biotechnology issues and their impacts on agriculture and the 
environment. This debate should “establish the full spectrum of the public’s views on GM 
and possible commercialisation of GM crops, and any conditions it might want to impose 
on this” (Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission 2003). It is remarkable 
that the GM Nation was a governmental operation since, as Jasanoff (2005) notes, in 
biotech times, upstream efforts to identify risks and explore ethical dilemmas were led by 
the science community itself.  
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The ideas of post-normal science, the “extended facts” and the “civic epistemologies” 
(Box 3.3) describe deeper involvement of non-experts in societal matters that are often 
dealt with in the scientific remit. These concepts explicitly exclude the “public 
understanding of science” model and the thesis of the public’s inability to act on scientific 
issues, - the so-called deficit model already mentioned, supporting instead the launch of 
various efforts for democratising science. These deeper involvements of society in the 
scientific enterprise arise from individuals and communities, realms that we call “citizen 
science” or “do it yourself movements” which rely on voluntary and self- or community 
supported initiatives that are seeing, with different forms of philanthropy, including 
crowd-funding, a fresh start. It must be noted that such an extension of participation calls 
for a reflection about the nature of the knowledge, values and normativity produced and 
on what might be the criteria and processes for ensuring their quality and integrity. 
Box 3.4 – Expressions of PNS: In Fukushima, radiation levels measured by non-experts were 
considerably high than those officially published; a biologist at Japan’s Ryukyu University wrote 
papers suggesting that radioactivity at Fukushima has triggered inherited deformities in a species 
of butterfly, but his research is paid for through private donations, including crowd-funding
21
. 
In Aquila, six scientists were condemned because they mislead the public and public authorities 
about earthquake risks discrediting an amateur earthquake forecaster who had warned public 
authorities about the upcoming strong earthquake.  
The Quantified Self movement is an international collaboration that encompasses users and 
makers of self-tracking tools. It describes the concept as “self knowledge through numbers”. The 
areas of interest are mainly health and lifestyle related. The user community is organised by cities, 
and frequently organise meet-ups to share their knowledge. It is an example of what Benkler & 
Nissembaun (2006) called commons-based “peer production” of knowledge. 
Civic epistemologies (see Box 3.3) in different settings and scales are technologies 
through which people are coproducing new ways of knowing and ordering the world at 
these scales (Miller 2005). We would argue that those civic epistemologies are a natural 
response to the critique of modern science meant to “speak truth to power” (Wildavsky 
1979), and of the Cartesian dream of rational value-free answers to human “problems”.. 
As Jasanoff (2005) argues, “science, no less than politics, must conform to […] established 
ways of public knowing in order to gain broad-base support – especially when science 
helps underwrite significant collective choices”. The question, we would argue, is not so 
much to what extent can the scientific community accommodate extended facts but 
rather about what spaces need to be created in order for co-existence, collaborations 
and co-productions – see Box 3.4.  
What quality assurance can be put in place in those existing or emerging realms? The 
actual issue here is to make (safe) space for these types of knowledge to acquire 
significance and be acted upon. 
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 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/asia/concerns-over-measurement-of-fukushima-
fallout.html?_r=0 
Box 3.3: The phrase civic epistemology was first used by Sheila Jasanoff in a series of 
European lectures in the spring of 2002 and widely explored on her 2005 book (Jsanaoff, 
2005). A useful definition provided in Miller (2005) is “civic epistemology as the broader array 
of activities, social processes, informal practices, and institutionalized procedures by which 
people collect, aggregate, validate, and wield claims to knowledge about nature and society in 
public and policy settings. This includes, in addition to science, accounting frameworks, styles 
of assessment, formal and informal policy analysis, local knowledge, the media, and public 
understanding.” 
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Citizen Science, Science 2.0, Science in Transition, Open Science, etc. 
In February 2014, the University College of London organised the 3rd citizen cyberscience 
summit22. Deeper forms of public engagement in co-production, described as citizen 
science23, science in transition, science 2.0, present themselves with different agency, 
gazes and guises – e.g. “Do it yourself”, self- and sous-veillance,  crowd-funded initiatives, 
hacker spaces, maker spaces, fablabs, and community ICT based research. The 
phenomenon is becoming stronger with the pervasiveness of our digital culture and the 
“open everything paradigm”. In his recent book, “The Open- Source Everything Manifesto 
– transparency, truth and trust” the former CIA case officer Robert D. Steele, argues that 
the Open everything paradigm is the condition sine qua non for restoring trust from the 
“closed world corruption and secrecy that has enabled massive fraud within 
governments, banks, corporations, [etc.]” advocating for “a world of bottom-up, 
consensual, collective decision-making as a means to solve the major crises facing our 
world today”, Steele (2014)24. At the JRC a few groups are already looking at these new 
styles in the ICT, environment and health fields.  
Privatisation of Science  
According to historian Philip Mirowski (1991; 2013), one of the consequences of having 
adopted neoliberal policies and a neoclassic stance in economics since the eighties has 
been a massive privatisation of research. This would have led to a corruption of the self-
governance method of science, and would be now jeopardising the very mechanism of 
science driven innovation. His 2011 book ‘Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science’ he 
argues inter alia that commoditised science loses quality, given that since the 1980s 
research moves away from government laboratories and large research laboratories of 
major corporations and universities into contract research organisation (CRO) acting 
under budget pressure and short time horizons. It is not difficult to see a link between 
commoditised research and the reproducibility debacle described above (The Economist, 
19 October 2013; The Economist 15 March 2014; Ioannides 2005).  
3.2 Co-production. Examining the context of 
science advice to policy  
 
“A full-blown political analysis of science and 
technology seeks to illuminate the 'co-production' of 
scientific and social order -that is, the production of 
mutually supporting forms of knowledge and forms 
of life - with all the detail and specificity that such a 
project entails” (Jasanoff 1996). 
 
The crisis arising within the scientific endeavour that we have described as crisis of 
quality, trust and legitimacy brings to mind Escher’s Drawing Hands – i.e. one hand writes 
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 See http://cybersciencesummit.org/ 
23
 ExCiteS is commonly referred to as a citizen science project and an example of empowerment of 
communities that traditionally would not participate in research projects, collecting and contributing their 
own data. But other forms of “citizen science” are more empowering of the participants such as those arising 
from the health sector, in which many people use wearable sensors to monitor their health and organise 
themselves into specific movements – se for example, the quantified self: http://quantifiedself.com/ 
24
 See also the article in The Guardian published in June 2014 regarding this book, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/19/open-source-revolution-conquer-
one-percent-cia-spy 
Figure 1 Drawing Hands by M.C. 
Escher. 1948 
Source: WikiArt. © MC Escher 
Company, B.V. 
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the other. The elements of the crisis arise from the scientific practices – in turn deeply 
affected by the neoliberal zeitgeist as discussed above. Science advice is dependent upon 
the context in which techno-science develops. In other words, science and advice based 
on it are co-produced and interwoven in the narratives we live by and sustain.  
3.2.1 Narratives we live by 
In this section we allude to some of the narratives we live by and sustain, a sort of new 
credo that affects not only the scientific endeavour, but also science policy and scientific 
advice to policy.  
 
Growth 
In the EU “growth” and “jobs” are the credo at the heart of any justification for political 
action. This is also true across research policies, priorities and funding. But what if the 
concept of growth – intended as growth of GDP per capita (by definition a mean over a 
population) – is devoid of salience, as three decades of increasing inequality have made 
the mean inadequate to describe living standards, so that other measures such as the 
median should be used, as recommended by the Stiglitz report (Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress 2009)25 ? Or, what if Philip 
Mirowski26 (2011) is right, and the economic profession is still committed in its majority 
to a neoliberal creed and neoclassic economic stance, which has been largely falsified by 
current events27. What if this is one of the root causes of the financial and economic 
crisis? We have already discussed the link between an economic stance that privileges 
the market as a solution to problems – and hence the market-place of ideas concept – 
and the resulting privatisation / commoditisation of science. Note that in the European 
discourse growth is systematically qualified by a set of adjectives, such as sustainable, 
smart, inclusive, which are among themselves the subject of formidable trade offs, 
typically the one between competitiveness – associated to higher productivity – and 
employment (Saltelli & Dragomirescu Gaina 2014).  
Innovation  
Innovation is one of the pillars on which the EU relies to counteract a low pace of growth 
in Europe. The ways in which the quest for “innovation” (i.e. the driver and engine of 
economic, social and environmental wealth) is heralded today in the EU is rather political. 
The word is used as a noun (substantive), e.g. “responsible innovation”, or as a qualifier, 
e.g. “Innovation Union” and “innovation policy”. This pervasive appeal acts as a 
normative driver of activities in the EU that seek to resolve (rescue) societal issues. 
The European Commission in particular presents “innovation” in a salvific role, used to 
justify and defend technology. The abusive usage of this concept in policy realms has also 
been object of criticism. For example, Van den Hove et al. (2011) reflected on the narrow 
focus of “innovation” as an “end in itself” in the form of products instead of a means to 
                                                        
25
 Recommendation 4: Give more prominence to the distribution of income, consumption and wealth: 
‘Average income, consumption and wealth are meaningful statistics, but they do not tell the whole story 
about living standards. For example, a rise in average income could be unequally shared across groups, 
leaving some households relatively worse-off than others. Thus, average measures of income, consumption 
and wealth should be accompanied by indicators that reflect their distribution. Median consumption (income, 
wealth) provides a better measure of what is happening to the “typical” individual or household than average 
consumption (income or wealth)’. (Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress 2009). With increasing inequality it is not unusual for the mean to increase (driven by the high end 
tail of the distribution) while the median recedes. The same point is made by the OECD (2011). 
26
 See Mirowski (2011) and references therein. 
27
 See Mirowski (1991) and Mirowski (2013). 
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achieve socially meaningful and responsible paths of human development taking into 
account different ideas of sustainability. Another critique saw that this political 
imperative should recognise better more socially distributed, autonomous and diverse 
collective forms of enterprise (European Commission 2007) as well as normativity. Partly 
to meet these criticism the EC has introduced in its research work programme a line of 
“Responsible Research and Innovation” in its Horizon 2020 programme. Perhaps 
unintentionally this recalls the movement for Appropriate Technology in the seventies, 
rightly seen with suspicion by ecologists as a fad to fix the most obvious downside of 
blind adoption of technology, any technology. The story is told in a chapter aptly titled 
‘Building the better mousetrap’ of a famous book from Longdon Winner (1986).  
Benessia and Funtowicz (2014) talk about the visions and promises of “innovation” and 
the techno-scientific imaginaries the term projects: wonder, power, control, and urgency 
(Benessia 2013). These imaginaries are cultural and socially implicit constructs that 
reinforce the modern ideals of science as a privileged knowledge system and technology 
as key instrument for action (Benessia & Funtowicz 2013; 2014). The problem, as the 
authors state, is that technoscientific enterprises often do not start with a question, but 
rather with an answer framed on arguments of optimisation, substitution or defeat, a set 
of silver bullets heralded in the name of sustainability, and security.  
This is not a new story, and one that was the subject of deep analysis in the historic 
ecological movement. According to Lewis Mumford this is a salient consequence of the 
tight relationship between technique and capital (Mumford 1934, p. 26-27). 
“Whether machines would have been invented so rapidly and pushed so zealously 
without the extra incentive of commercial profit is extremely doubtful: for all the 
more skilled handicraft occupations were deeply entrenched, and the introduction 
of printing, for example, was delayed as much as twenty years in Paris by the 
bitter opposition of the guild of scribes and copyists. But while technics 
undoubtedly owes an honest debt to capitalism, as it does likewise to war, it was 
nevertheless unfortunate that the machine was conditioned, at the outset, by 
these foreign institutions and took on characteristics that had nothing essentially 
to do with the technical processes or the forms of work. Capitalism utilized the 
machine, not to further social welfare, but to increase private profit: mechanical 
instruments were used for the aggrandizement of the ruling classes. It was 
because of capitalism that the handicraft industries in both Europe and other 
parts of the world were recklessly destroyed by machine products, even when the 
latter were inferior to the thing they replaced: for the prestige of improvement 
and success and power was with the machine, even when it improved nothing, 
even when technically speaking it was a failure. It was because of the possibilities 
of profit that the place of the machine was overemphasized and the degree of 
regimentation pushed beyond what was necessary to harmony or efficiency. It 
was because of certain traits in private capitalism that the machine - which was a 
neutral agent - has often seemed, and in fact has sometimes been, a malicious 
element in society, careless of human life, indifferent to human interests. The 
machine has suffered for the sins of capitalism; contrariwise, capitalism has often 
taken credit for the virtues of the machine.”  
Besides, different cultures of innovation exist arising from different cultures of 
technology (ed. Nowotny 2006), while the call for innovation of the present European 
discourse is presented to us hegemonically. 
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Evidence based policy to policy based evidence? 
“Evidence based policy” is another narrative by which we live and which is high on the 
European Commission‘s agenda, the latest slogan being a quest for a centralised 
“evidence service” in the words of A. Glover, the Chief Science Adviser of President J. 
Barroso (see Wildson 2014); she suggested that “the incoming commission must find 
better ways of separating evidence-gathering processes from the ‘political imperative’”.  
This suggestion is problematic; on one hand it rejects the inevitability of co-production of 
scientific and social order (Jasanoff 1996); on the other hand it does not recognise that 
evidence gathering is also a matter of choice of the questions to be asked and 
researched; of the framings in which questions are tackled; governance of uncertainty 
and unknown; science therefore is not apolitical and sides are mostly taken in the pre-
analytical phase of a study, when the question to be addressed, as well as the chosen 
methods to tackle it, are framed. 
It is interesting to note that the newly-elected President of the European Commission, 
Jean Claude Juncker, recognises this issue. In his speech of the 15th July 2014:  
“I also intend to review the legislation applicable to the authorisation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms. To me, it is simply not right that under the 
current rules, the Commission is legally forced to authorise new organisms for 
import and processing even though a clear majority of Member States is against. 
The Commission should be in a position to give the majority view of 
democratically elected governments at least the same weight as scientific advice, 
notably when it comes to the safety of the food we eat and the environment in 
which we live.” 28  
Stilgoe (2013) makes the point that the assumption behind evidence-based policy is that 
there are hard facts and soft values, while there are plenty of examples that show how 
much they are intertwined. 
But there is an even more problematic issue with this narrative; the danger of evidence-
based policy being turned into policy-based evidence, not necessarily because of 
lobbyists’ pressure or because of some wicked characteristics of the responsible policy 
makers, but simply because of the frantic pace of the policy cycles internal to the 
European Institutions, whereby by the time the bell for evidence rings in the office of the 
tasked officer the policy options have already been taken. It is in these settings that the 
standard for quality must be set high both for the internal institutional peer review 
process as well as for the consultation of stakeholders. This has implications for the JRC 
as we shall discuss next.    
Consequentialist culture versus an anticipatory culture 
We do not intend here to review the critique to the culture of cost benefit analyses and 
risk assessment29 as a basis for consequentialist governance that has been underpinning 
a great deal of research on impacts of science and technology and political action.  
Suffice say here that there are indeed cases where cost benefit analysis are pushed too 
far, quantifying the unquantifiable, or where a problem of acceptability of a new 
technology is arbitrarily reframed as an issue of risk. In this respect we turn again for 
example to Langdon Winner (1989) for the core of the argument:  
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 Available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/pg_en.pdf 
29
 This is a field on its own right. We can suggest classic reading like Krimsky and Golding 1992; Perrow 1984; 
Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990; Jasanoff 2010; but so many others such as Taleb (2007; 2012), and European 
Commission (2007). 
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“[T]he risk debate is one that certain kinds of social interests can expect to lose 
by the very act of entering. In our times, under most circumstances in which the 
matter is likely to come up, deliberations about risk are bound to have a strongly 
conservative drift. The conservatism to which I refer is one that upholds the status 
quo of production and consumption in our industrial, market oriented society, a 
status quo supported by a long history of economic development in which 
countless new technological applications were introduced with scant regard to 
the possibility that they might cause harm (…) Fortunately, many issues talked 
about as risks can be legitimately described in other ways. Confronted with any 
cases of past, present, or obvious future harm, it is possible to discuss that harm 
directly without pretending that you are playing craps. A toxic waste disposal site 
placed in your neighborhood need not be defined as a risk; it might appropriately 
be defined as a problem of toxic waste. Air polluted by automobiles and industrial 
smokestacks need not be defined as a ‘risk’; it might still be called by the old-
fashioned name, ‘pollution’. New Englanders who find acid rain falling on them 
are under no obligation to begin analyzing the ‘risks of acid rain’; they might 
retain some Yankee stubbornness and confound the experts by talking about ‘that 
destructive acid rain’ and what's to be done about it. A treasured natural 
environment endangered by industrial activity need not be regarded as 
something at ‘risk’; one might regard it more positively as an entity that ought to 
be preserved in its own right”.  
As a viable alternative to risk we would like to allude here to another trend that focuses 
on anticipation and anticipatory governance. Anticipation denotes “building the capacity 
to respond to unpredicted and unpredictable risks” (Guston 2008). Anticipatory 
governance requires the development of a foresight capacity that includes not only 
formal methodologies but also informal ones that extend the imagination and their 
assessment to the public; anticipatory governance implies reflexivity based on both 
analytical capacities and on relevant empirical knowledge. Moreover, “[A]nticipation 
implies an awareness of the co-production of sociotechnical knowledge and the 
importance of richly imagining sociotechnical alternatives that might inspire its use” 
(Barben et al. 2008, p. 992). Such a culture of anticipation needs to be further reinforced 
at the JRC. Note also the renewed societal attention on the topic driven inter alia by the 
successful book of Nassim N. Taleb on anti-fragility (2012).  
The purpose of this section on narratives, where we focus on growth, innovation and 
evidence-based policy, was to make the point that narratives need not to be taken for 
granted, need not to be panaceas, need not to be inevitable, cannot be narratives by 
which we live if appropriate space is not given to interrogate them. We believe that the 
JRC should secure this space. 
3.2.3 Cultures of Advice 
Heroes and Boards 
Here we examine a few relevant discussions of science advice to policy.30  
There are (inevitably) different cultures of science advice in Europe31, from the “heroic 
model” (Pielke 2013; Doubleday & Wilsdon 2013) of scientific advice impersonated by 
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 In an edited volume Guimarães Pereira and Funtowicz (2009) have collected several cases that illustrate 
the ongoing challenging role of science in policy making, sustaining that the challenge is to develop new 
decision‐making styles in order to cope with deep uncertainty, even ignorance, about facts, and in a plurality 
of value systems.  
31
 As there are different cultures of scientific production, communication and publication. 
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Chief Scientific Advisors (CSAs) as in the UK and few other countries, to other models that 
rely on broader consultations with civil society, such as the Danish Board of Technology.  
We will briefly look at those two 
models and highlight some of the 
ongoing challenges.  
We start with New Zealand’s chief 
science adviser Peter Gluckman. 
In a note recently published in 
Nature (2014) he finds science 
advice challenging in issues that 
he suggests have “the hallmarks 
of what has been called post-normal science” (PNS -  Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993, p. 744).  
As discussed above, the post-normal science situations lead necessarily to changes in the 
science-policy model, both in terms of the ways in which science underpins policy and 
the ways in which the policy process informs science. 
Using again the words of CSA Peter Gluckman, PNS issues are those that “are urgent and 
of high public and political concern; the people involved hold strong positions based on 
their values, and the science is complex, incomplete and uncertain." He offers ten 
principles for policy advice to governments that he describes as an activity to “elucidating 
the evidence-informed options, rather than simply advocating a course of action”32, from 
which we highlight two, that we see as relevant for the JRC:  
 the expectation of the CSA should be to inform policy, not make it, while 
recognising the limits of science and of the advice;  
 the CSA should engage with wider members of the scientific community, as well 
as with the policy community.  
 
As Pielke (2013) noted in his address to the UK chief scientific adviser, “science advice” is 
a misnomer as it implies a deficit model, where the “advice” is artificially 
decontextualised from the political situation. Hence he further notes that science 
advisers are not “superheroes”, in the sense that they cannot “carry the authority of 
science as a counterbalance to the messiness of politics”. Pielke (2014) argues that 
“improving science advice in Europe will depend on improving advisory processes, not 
scrapping them”. In what balanced form, if that is possible, should an individual advisor 
act as “spokesperson” of a multi-disciplinary community of scientists and researchers in a 
specific field? It is interesting to note that many prestigious newspapers offer advice 
(checklists of dos and don’ts and principles) on how scientific advice and in particular CSA 
should do their job. This debate is relevant for the JRC. 
We now move to other models of science advice which do not impersonate such activity. 
An example is the extinct and now refurbished Danish Board of Technology33. 
The DBT describes itself as working at the interface between “public challenges, 
technology, knowledge, values and actions to be taken. The DBT [counsel] decision-
makers about possibilities and consequences for citizens, environment and society and 
create platforms for participants to pool their knowledge, finding sustainable and 
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 The 10 principles are: 1) Maintain the trust of many; 2) Protect the independence of advice; 3) Report to 
the top; 4) Distinguish science for policy from policy for science; 5) Expect to inform policy, not make it; 6) 
Give science privilege as an input into policy; 7) Recognising the limits of science; 8) Act as a broker not an 
advocate; 9) Engage the scientific community; 10) Engage the policy community 
33
 See http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?page=forside.php3&language=uk.  
Box 3.5: Doubleday and Wilsdon (2013) organised a 
series of small essays about the future of science 
advice in the UK. They conclude with ideas that 
could be helpful for a debate at the JRC: collegial 
work modes across all departments of the UK 
government; promotion of interdisciplinary 
approaches blending natural and social sciences; 
championing of the full breath of scientific expertise; 
strengthen foresight; and action with humility. 
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interdisciplinary solutions. The DBT works with developing dialogue based and involving 
working methods at a local, national and global level. The DBT furthermore implements 
projects at a national and an international level for the EU and globally in collaboration 
with the United Nations”. The activities of the DBT spans from technologies (e.g. 
biotechnology and ICT) through  economic sectors developments (e.g. transports and 
agriculture. DBT Methods are participatory in nature: World Wide Views (WWViews); 
Inter-disciplinary Work Groups; Interview Meeting; Cafe Seminar; Citizens’ Summit; 
Citizens’ Jury; Citizens Hearing; Future Panel; Hearings for Parliament; The Voting 
Conference; The Consensus Conference; Workshop Methods (Future workshops, 
Perspective workshops, Scenario workshops, Future search conferences); Danish 
participatory models. 
Extended scientific advice to policy 
Petersen, Heinrichs and Peters (2010) investigated transformations of scientific policy 
advice in relation to mass media, arguing that the increasing mediatisation of science 
deeply affects the ways in which policy-makers refer to scientific expertise. For example, 
policy makers cannot afford to ignore scientific knowledge and controversies once these 
are published in the media, especially since the protagonists are scientists known or 
respected by the public. In one way or the other, we are witnessing a process of mass 
media expertise which, the authors argue, has altered the relationships between advisors 
and policy makers. 
It is interesting also to see how the science of policy advice has stepped out from 
academic circles and practitioners’ spheres and is now followed by the media. For 
example, the British newspaper “The Guardian” has for the past months maintaining a 
series of informed commentary about science advice to policy34.  
Scientific advice - a reflexive enterprise? 
Pielke (2007) offers a reflection on how the policy-relevant scientific endeavour is 
strongly framed by styles of advice and science policies. This issue is particularly 
important for the JRC. The research effort at the JRC is often conditioned by the 
questions of those who order the studies and activities – often other departments of the 
European Commission. What if those questions are incomplete and even irrelevant? Isn’t 
the JRC embracing a trap that compromises its researchers’ integrity? 
Jasanoff (2013) notes that scientific advisers are bound by the same principles and 
discipline of science practices (i.e. “known facts, reliable methods, responsible 
professional codes, and the ultimate test of peer review”). For this reason “science 
advisers are not inclined to introspection in situations where their work fails to persuade”. 
Instead, she argues, it is often the case that such failures are attributed to factors that are 
external to the scientific endeavour, such as an ignorant and misbehaved public, or 
perverse media and corrupting “powerful corporate funders or other large interest 
groups”. Indeed, we note that it is a practice inside the European Commission to seek 
(through at times paternalistic approaches) a model – be it behavioural, psychological or 
cultural - to explain why is that the public dissent (Winner 1989; Wynne 1993).  This can 
also lead to overt attempts to manipulate public and media opinion to counteract dissent 
and disengagement. We have witnessed several times that when strong dissent exists, 
but stakes are high, not all perspectives have the same legitimate voice (e.g. on GMOs, 
and on the Internet of things). As an example of different perspectives on GMO see Box 
3.6. 
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  see http://www.theguardian.com/science/science-policy 
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According to Jasanoff (2013): 
“It is well recognised that in thorny areas of public policy, where certain 
knowledge is difficult to come by, science advisers can offer at best educated 
guesses and reasoned judgments, not unvarnished truth. They can help define 
plausible strategic choices in the light of realistic assessments of evidence; rarely 
can they decree the precise paths that society should follow.”  
Trust is a condition sine qua non for the recognition of the role of science advisory 
systems; such systems and institutions need scrutiny, as any other democratic 
institutions. “If judges may not presume to stand above the law, still less should science 
advisers seek to insulate themselves from the critical gaze of the sciences of science 
advice” (Jasanoff 2013, p. 67). 
3.3 Debate at the JRC 
 
We have highlighted several of the challenges for the scientific endeavour within and in 
its context. Many of those, if not all, need to be faced at the JRC. We highlight a few that 
require a debate with all at the JRC:  
 ‘Policy-based evidence’ can hardly be separated from ‘evidence-based policy’ 
when the dense agenda and strict deadlines of the policy cycle rush our scientists 
to support colleagues in the policy branches of the European Commission. The 
Box 3.6 - Inconvenient truths of GMOs – an STS perspective:  
Proponents of GMOs observe that citizens’ hostility to GMOs is at odds with the evidence that 
GMOs do not have negative health effects. According to the results of an EU-funded study 
(Marris et al. 2001), food safety is not prominent in the list of citizens’ concerns on GMOs. A 
list of concerns registered by Marris et al. includes:  
“1. Why do we need GMOs? What are the 
benefits? 
 2. Who will benefit from their use? 
 3. Who decided that they should be 
developed and how? 
 4. Why were we not better informed about 
their use in our food, before their arrival on 
the market? 
5. Why are we not given an effective choice 
about whether or not to buy and consume 
these products? 
 6. Do regulatory authorities have sufficient 
powers and resources to effectively counter-
balance large companies who wish to develop 
these products? “ 
 
Instead, GMO concerns are almost universally framed as food safety scares including.  A 
somewhat abusive example is from the Economist, discussing the introduction of a GMO 
labelling scheme in Vermont (US):  
Montpelier is America’s only McDonald’s-free state capital. A fitting place, then, for a 
law designed to satisfy the unfounded fears of foodies. (The Economist 10 May 2014).  
Just ask about genetically modified crops, declared safe by the scientific 
establishment, but reviled as Frankenfoods by the Subarus-and-sandals set. (The 
Economist 10 May 2014). 
This is an example of a more general class of problem, where cost-benefit analysis or risk 
analysis is performed to demonstrate the safety of a new technology after the technology has 
been introduced. As cogently noted by Langdon Winner (1989 p. 138-163), ecologists should 
not be led into the trap to argue about the ‘safety’ of a technology after the technology has 
been introduced. They should instead question the broader power, policy and profit 
implications of that introduction.  
(Source:  Saltelli & Funtowicz 2015). 
Straw man - Page 28 
former though should not obliterate the latter. In these circumstances, 
transparency and humility become JRC’s best line of defence to uphold quality 
throughout the process of scientific advice to policy.  
 Linked to the above is the issue of “stealth advocacy”, where scientists claim to 
be focusing on science but are really seeking to advance a political agenda or, 
even unwittingly, a normative stance.  
 Organisations such as the JRC, embedded into the policy cycle, may become 
hostage to one of the parties in the dispute in cases where different branches of 
the European Commission may happen to hold divergent views.   
 A dangerous mindset in science advice to policy is adherence to the so called 
‘deficit model’. In the Policy Paper by President Barroso’s Science and Technology 
Advisory Council issued in August 2013 (Science and Technology Advisory Council 
2013) it is suggested that “More appropriate education programs, effective 
investments into initiatives for improving public understanding of the interplay 
between science, technology, institutional settings and patterns of behaviour, 
effective and targeted communication programs that are tailored towards 
different target groups in Europe, and last but not least a major drive for public 
participation are the main ingredients that can help Europe to live up to its claim 
of a knowledge-based continent with a broad future.” Whilst the document 
advocates the importance of trust in institutions and the need for a new science 
and society contract, it also sustains the ‘deficit model’, and the ‘public 
understanding of science’ approach, while being critical of “post-modern 
thinking”, portrayed as a source of arbitrary or interested truth claims (p. 4).    
 In the face of contradictory concepts of advice, what is the JRC positioning? In 
case the EC maintains a Chief Science Adviser, how should the JRC act on issues 
where both the JRC and the CSA are called to give an opinion? Can this opinion 
differ from that of the CSA?   
The JRC should reflect that its own role is as a part of the European Commission, at a 
point in time where the European project is not at its healthiest, where the narrative of 
the European enterprise has to some extent gotten lost in the dramatic challenges of 
budget consolidation, increasing inequality, and imbalances between countries. That this 
happens when science simultaneously suffers a crisis of trust and credibility, should 
remind us all of how complex the context is for the suggested reconsideration of JRC’s 
role in policy advice.     
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4. The JRC: an “Emperor is naked” model?  
In the last sections we have tried to situate the JRC in the broad institutional 
international scene while reviewing the challenges of the Post-Cartesian momentum35 
and the zeitgeist change underway. We presented elements of an internal and external 
crisis to science and knowledge production that affect not only scientific practice but also 
scientific advice; we submit that the JRC is in a unique position to address those. Rather 
than trying to continue things according to received wisdom – what we designate 
elsewhere as Cartesian dream - we acknowledge that the JRC needs to operate within 
existing conditions, and we are convinced that this constitutes momentum for exploring a 
different understanding of knowledge production, power and societal organisation in 
order to respond to the crisis.  
 
Hence, there are no panacean routes to engage with change; in fact we think that this 
should be object of a collective reflection involving all JRC researchers. Here we offer a 
model that tries to encompass key challenges of our current predicament, embracing the 
criticisms and exploring models of operation, taking stock and extending the two central 
features of the JRC: it being part of the policy cycle on the one hand and its natural 
closeness to academia on the other. We called it “the emperor is naked” model, after the 
story of Hans Christian Andersen, which emphasises 3 complementary cultures: 
 
(1) Quality.  Developing a culture of extended peer review: by embracing/ pursuing 
emerging epistemologies and by putting social sciences at the heart of JRC’s operation. 
The quality model proposed here aims for social robustness of techno-science proposals, 
as advocated in PNS and Mode 2 science, acknowledging that emerging normativities and 
ontologies need to be accounted for.  
 
(2) Reflexivity. Developing a culture of reflexivity: the JRC needs to train itself as a sceptic 
body of researchers inquisitive about policy agendas and political imaginaries through 
knowledge assessment. This reflexivity model aims at challenging narratives based on 
business as usual and at testing their relevance against social agendas and social value. 
 
(3) Humility. Developing a culture of engagement: firmly rejecting the “public 
understanding of science” model and valuing dialogic governance on the 
acknowledgment that in the face of different types of uncertainties and unknowns, 
anticipation of impacts, determination of relevant facts and normativities, questions to 
be asked and methods of enquiry are collective tasks not to be relinquished to powerful 
elites.   
 
This model explicitly recognises the JRC as a boundary institution, which needs to invest 
on better liaison with the public, creating safe spaces of interaction and engagement, and 
to reinforce its capacity in the field of science and technology studies (STS).  
 
 
                                                        
35
 In a forthcoming volume with Routledge edited by Guimarães Pereira and Funtowicz, a number of cases 
are included to illustrate this observation. 
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4.1 Quality 
As discussed above the JRC must foremost strive to be non-dogmatic in the way it offers 
advice, even when the dogmatism descends from the recipient of the advice.  
 
A central issue of today’s scientific enterprise is the link between trust and quality. 
Standards for policy-relevant science and for the quality of the evidence are now 
insistently called upon, even from the columns of Nature36 where Ian Boyd (2013), 
speaking in its capacity of science adviser to DEFRA, the UK government department for 
environment, food and rural affairs, laments about ‘concern about unreliability in 
scientific literature‘ and ‘ systematic bias in research’. This is where the JRC’s role is 
irreplaceable; the JRC can develop evaluation strategies and provide pedigrees for what 
is taken as evidence-based policy. Hence, the JRC has a role to play not only in producing 
facts and figures, not only in modelling, but also in the verification of the worldviews that 
sustain them, engaging all relevant social actors in that quality assurance process.     
 
4.2 Reflexivity 
Lack of institutional reflexivity seeks on and transfers to external factors, institutional 
failures. Science is seen as the epitome of self-reflexivity, but as Wynne (1993) noted, the 
prevalence of the PUS model - which sees the public as ignorant, risk-adverse, unreflexive 
and misbehaved – has made prominent instead that scientific institutions are poorly 
reflexive when it comes to their unstated presumed “models of the public that structure 
their scientific discourses” (Wynne 1993) So, reflexivity here is understood as not merely 
internal consistency, but rather as the continuous interrogation of the narratives that 
sustain institutions. Again, we see here a clear opportunity for the JRC, through 
knowledge assessment, to interrogate and not blindly sustain what is coming to be 
designated as “policy based evidence”. This, we argue, needs a shift of culture, i.e. 
development and or strengthen of new meanings for policy support: anticipation, 
extended peer review, ethics, knowledge assessment, upstream engagement, etc. 
4.3 Humility 
 
Our last pillar is Humility; humility in the face of what we don’t know and what we cannot 
anticipate. Humility recognises the post-Cartesian momentum, i.e. the recognition that 
not only the human ability to anticipate is limited but also the recognition that the 
questions to be made about particular heralded routes of human betterment need to be 
done beyond the usual self-attributed privileged spaces of enquiry.  
Jasanoff described ‘technologies of humility’ as the institutionalised and pragmatic tools 
that allow influential and genuine engagement of the public in matters that concern all – 
                                                        
36
 Ian Boyd calls for an auditing process to help policy-makers to navigate research bias 
Box 4.1. Technologies of Humility (Jasanoff 2003; 2007) These are methods, or better yet 
institutionalized habits of thought, that try to come to grips with the ragged fringes of human 
understanding – the unknown, the uncertain, the ambiguous, and the uncontrollable. 
Acknowledging the limits of prediction and control, technologies of humility confront ‘head-on’ 
the normative implications of our lack of perfect foresight. They call for different expert 
capabilities and different forms of engagement between experts, decision-makers, and the 
public than were considered needful in the governance structures of high modernity. They 
require not only the formal mechanisms of participation but also an intellectual environment 
in which citizens are encouraged to bring their knowledge and skills to bear on the resolution 
of common problems.” 
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see box 4.1. This is in line with the model of “extended participation” (Funtowicz 2006), 
where citizens become both critics and creators in the knowledge production process. As 
a boundary institution, it would be a missed opportunity for the JRC to not further 
engage with European citizenry in the science and technology matters that concern 
them, and whose disengagement shapes science and technology anyway, often in painful 
ways for policy making. 
4.4 A roadmap 
In this section we propose a possible roadmap to implement what we called the 
‘emperor is naked’ model at the JRC. 
Setting the Scene 
(1) An interview or a piece authored by the JRC’s Director General on a well-read 
journal such as Science or Nature, to launch a serious reflexivity programme at 
the JRC on a modern vision of science advice . An example to take inspiration 
from on matters of style and content could be the piece on Nature of New 
Zealand’s chief science adviser (Gluckman 2014)   
(2)  Establishment of a science and technologies (STS) group (a core team plus a 
group of young persons from all institutes) in charge of reinforcing social sciences 
at the JRC and implement the reflexivity program 
(3) A set of ethnographic studies at the JRC to investigate practice (past and current) 
of boundary work (including policy advice, communication, engagement and 
dissemination) 
(4) Anthropological studies of JRC’s scientists-in-action (cooperation between STS 
team and teams from the institutes).    
(5) Partnerships with key institutions that perform STS work. 
Creating spaces 
(6) Creation of a “Public Engagement Lab.” that aims both to engage researchers 
with the public and to create the interdisciplinary space among researchers at 
the JRC (a physical as well as a virtual space). 
(7) Demonstration cases of interdisciplinary work for three chosen cases per year 
with three different institutes. 
Training 
(8) Training on methods that span STS and other relevant social research methods.  
(9) Invited seminars with STS scholars (max. four per year) – for two years. 
Embedding  
(10) Annual two-day meetings at the JRC with work from JRC researchers and invited 
STS scholars and practitioners. Putting the JRC in the forefront of a reflexivity 
culture and engagement with EU citizens. 
(11) Handbook for JRC researchers – the “emperor is naked model”: how to develop 
a sceptical culture. 
4.5 A final thought 
Science and technology have been the basis of progress and economic growth, and the 
instruments whereby humanity exercises its control, or in Descartes own words, “humans 
as masters and possessors of Nature”. This worldview can be ascribed to the Cartesian 
dream and to the modern secular state, i.e. prediction and control over a disenchanted 
Nature through rational management and governance. Our approach, which responds to 
the several ‘crises’ described in the present brief, is to consider new ways in which 
science can sustain our planet and enrich our lives and to make such a body of knowledge 
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available to JRC collective intelligence. The key for science to remain a legitimate and 
trustworthy source of knowledge is that society will have to engage in the processes of 
knowledge co‐production, which does not only include science, but also other 
knowledge. What place better than the JRC for this exercise of quality, reflexivity and 
engagement to take place?  
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5. Towards a new mission 
As the Commission's in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre's mission is to 
provide EU policies with reflexive, independent, evidence-based scientific and technical 
support throughout the whole policy cycle. Working in close cooperation with policy 
Directorates-General and EU citizens, the JRC addresses key societal challenges arising 
from the current innovation agenda through exploring and developing new methods, 
tools and standards, and sharing its know-how with the Member States, the scientific 
community and international partners. 
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